Risk premiums and macroeconomic dynamics in a heterogeneous agent model by De Graeve, Ferre et al.
The opinions and results mentioned in this paper do not reflect the position of the Institution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 : 
 
 
Discussion Paper available online :  http://fdef.uni.lu/index.php/fdef_FR/economie/crea 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For editorial correspondence, please contact : elisa.ferreira@uni.lu 
 
University of Luxembourg 
Faculty of Law, Economics and Finance 
162A, avenue de la Faïencerie 
L-1511 Luxembourg 
 
CREA 
Discussion 
Paper 
 
2009-17 
Risk Premiums and Macroeconomic Dynamics 
in a Heterogeneous Agent Model 
 
available online : http://wwwfr.uni.lu/recherche/fdef/crea/publications2/discussion_papers/2009 
 
 
Ferre De Graeve, Sveriges Riksbank 
Maarten Dossche, National Bank of Belgium 
Marina Emiris, Bank of Canada
Henri Sneessens, University of Luxembourg 
Raf Wouters, National Bank of Belgium 
 
 
December, 18, 2009 
Center for Research in Economic Analysis 
University of Luxembourg 
Risk Premiums and Macroeconomic Dynamics in a
Heterogeneous Agent Model
Ferre De Graevea;y, Maarten Dosscheb, Marina Emirisc,
Henri Sneessensd, Raf Woutersb
a Sveriges Riksbank, b National Bank of Belgium, c Bank of Canada
d University of Luxembourg
December 18, 2009
Abstract
We analyze nancial risk premiums and real economic dynamics in a DSGE model
with three types of agents - shareholders, bondholders and workers - that di¤er in
participation in the capital market and in attitude towards risk and intertemporal sub-
stitution. Aggregate productivity and distribution risks are transferred across these
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agents via the bond market and via an e¢ cient labor contract. The result is a combi-
nation of volatile returns to capital and a highly cyclical consumption process for the
shareholders, which are two important ingredients for generating high and counter-
cyclical risk premiums. These risk premiums are consistent with a strong propagation
mechanism through an elastic supply of labor, rigid real wages and a countercyclical la-
bor share. Based on the empirical estimates for the two sources of real macroeconomic
risk, the model generates signicant and plausible time variation in both bond and
equity risk premiums. Interestingly, the single largest jump in both the risk premium
and the price of risk is observed during the current recession.
JEL codes: E32, E44, G12
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1 Introduction
Economic models typically have a hard time reproducing the observed risk premiums and real
statistics simultaneously. The need for such a consistent model is high. For instance, it would
make it possible to extract the information contained in asset prices about future growth
and ination expectations of private investors by controlling for the implied risk premiums.
At the same time, a model that can jointly match nancial and real statistics would have
strong empirical validity. The standard DSGE model with endogenous capital and labor has
problems generating su¢ ciently large premiums and realistic real statistics because investors
have various channels through which they can smooth consumption. Various solutions have
been suggested in the literature to overcome this problem within the standard representative
agent model. Recent examples include, among others, Lettau and Uhlig (2000) who evaluate
the potential role of habit formation, Boldrin et al. (2001) suggest frictions in the labor
allocation between sectors, Uhlig (2007) proposes real wage rigidity as a possible solution.
In this paper, we follow Guvenen (2009), Danthine and Donaldson (2002) and Danthine et
al. (2006), and focus on the role of heterogeneous capital market participation across agents.
This setup implies a number of interesting features that can facilitate the joint explanation
of real and nancial statistics. First, in such a setup, it is no longer aggregate consumption
that drives the pricing kernel of asset prices. There is a well documented literature that
suggests that the consumption of wealthy agents, that hold the majority of the capital stock,
is more volatile than aggregate consumption. Second, in a context of heterogeneous agents,
the valuation of the capital stock is not only determined by aggregate risk, but also by distri-
bution risk. The volatile and highly procyclical nature of prots can potentially contribute
3
signicantly to the explanation of the equity risk premium. Importantly, it can help to dif-
ferentiate between stock and bond risk premiums. The risk sharing between heterogeneous
agents does not only a¤ect the pricing of the claims on future prots but also o¤ers the nat-
ural context to explain the observed acyclical behavior of real wages and the countercyclical
behavior of the wage share. Third, an explanation of the risk premium based on hetero-
geneous capital market participation across agents has important empirical implications for
the nancial behavior of the di¤erent agents, for instance in terms of wealth accumulation
and the resulting wealth distribution. Therefore, this approach has the advantage that the
underlying assumptions can be validated more easily compared to alternative explanations
which are often based on non-observable features of the utility functions (another popular
solution to the equity premium in the context of a representative agent model).
We integrate the models of Danthine and Donaldson and Guvenen in a general frame-
work in which all agents participate in the labor market and have similar preferences, but
with heterogeneous attitudes towards risk and intertemporal substitution and with varying
degrees of capital market access. The model contains three types of agents: workers, who do
not participate in the capital market, bondholders and shareholders. Workers and sharehold-
ers will exchange their income risk through a labor contract as proposed in Danthine and
Donaldson. Bondholders and shareholders will share their risk through the bond market, as
in Guvenen. As a rst contribution, we show that this model, driven by a combination of
aggregate productivity and distribution shocks, is able to generate signicant risk premiums
as well as realistic aggregate volatilities and correlations. In particular, the optimal labor
contract, motivated by risk sharing considerations, explains the observed rigidity and low
volatility in the real wage, as well as the countercyclical wage share. The optimal wage
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contract and the stochastic distribution risk -which takes up possible shifts in the relative
bargaining power of workers and rms- deliver a high volatility in prots, returns to equity
and price-dividend ratios. This high volatility in the returns from capital, combined with
the high concentration of capital market participation, results in a concentration of risk and
a consequently high consumption volatility for the shareholders. The bond trade between
bond- and shareholders contributes only marginally to our results. In the face of distribution
risk, shareholders are reluctant to bear additional aggregate risk through the bond trade.
This result suggests important interactions between the two risk sharing devices in a general
setup.
By integrating the two risk sharing mechanisms in a common framework, the specic
features of each mechanism and their dependence on specic assumptions become more
apparent. Furthermore, we evaluate the performance of the model by studying their impli-
cations for both bond and equity returns. This focus on a variety of assets (bonds, as well as
stocks) imposes additional discipline in building the model. For one, reproducing observed
di¤erences in returns to stocks and bonds has implications for the degree of exibility one
has in modelling the agentsstochastic discount factor. Moreover, the macroeconomic uc-
tuations that underlie the various risk premiums are model-consistent. Put di¤erently, the
general equilibrium framework adopted ensures a joint explanation, without relying on, e.g.,
reduced form macroeconomic dynamics to mimic risk premiums.
The third contribution of the paper is applied in nature. We estimate the stochastic
structure of the model based on real US data over the period 1947q1-2009q1. The resulting
series for the productivity and distribution shocks are fed into model. Based on these two real
sources of macroeconomic risk, the model generates signicant and plausible time variation in
5
the nancial premiums. Taking into account the limited stochastic structure of this exercise,
the resulting time variation in risk premiums compares well to available proxies and estimates
in the literature. The risk premiums display a strong increase during each of the postwar
recession periods. In particular, the single largest jump in both the risk premium and the
price of risk is observed during the current recession. We also perform predictive regressions
for stocks and bonds to further measure the success and limitations of the model.
In section 2, we present the model and the estimation results for its stochastic structure.
Section 3 documents the main nancial and real statistics implied by the model, and com-
pares them with analogue statistics in the data and implied statistics of the representative
agent version of the model. The specic role of the two risk sharing mechanisms is ana-
lyzed in detail. In Section 4, we perform a sensitivity exercise to illustrate the role of the
stochastic structure, the structural parameters, the specication of the utility function, and
the heterogeneity across agents. The di¤erence between the equity and bond premium is
discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 presents the results on the implied time variation
in the risk premiums, and shows how this variation a¤ects the predictive power of the price-
dividend ratio and the yield spread. Our analysis is based on simulation experiments with
the rst, second and third order approximation of the non-linear model using the Dynare
and Dynare++ toolbox.
2 The Model
We start from a general setup which considers three types of agents. A rst group of agents
consists of the standard portfolio investors that allocate their wealth between stocks and
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bonds. These agents act as the marginal investors that clear the bond and stock markets.
Therefore, their stochastic discount factor will determine the pricing of the corresponding
risks. Motivated by empirical evidence, we assume that the portfolio managers are character-
ized by a lower risk aversion than the other agents in the economy. We refer to these agents
as shareholders (Type 1 agents). A second group of agents, bondholders (T2), participates in
the capital market by buying bonds. Their bondholdings depend on their desire to smooth
consumption as well as their precautionary savings, and determine the wealth accumulation
of these agents. Finally, a third group of agents, workers (T3), does not participate in the
capital market and consumes immediately its income from labor. In order to smooth their
marginal utility, these agents are completely dependent on the labor contract which provides
the only opportunity for them to share their income risk with the other agents in the econ-
omy, in particular with the shareholders as owners of the rms. In a context of continued
labor-rm relations, the optimal labor contract guarantees an exogenously determined ratio
between the marginal utility of the workers and the marginal utility of the shareholder of the
rms. More risk averse type 2 and type 3 agents will try to transfer some of the aggregate
risk towards the shareholders, either via savings in the bond market or via the wage contract.
In exchange the shareholders will require a higher return.
This general setting allows us to review specic cases that have been considered pre-
viously in the literature. When the economy is vacated by shareholders alone, the model
is very similar to the standard representative agent model, analyzed in, e.g., Uhlig (2007).
This makes it easy to compare the outcomes of the general model with the representative
agent version, and to review the implications of the various model assumptions within a
more standard setup. The sensitivity of the outcomes to the various model features will be
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discussed extensively in the next section.
Alternatively, when more than one type of household is present, the model encompasses
a variety of asset pricing models with heterogeneous agents. For instance, when both share-
holders and bondholders are present, our model is similar to that of Guvenen (2009). Al-
ternatively, when the economy consists of shareholders as well as workers, our setup is very
close to that of Danthine and Donaldson (2002). With all three agents present, our model
has the avor of agent heterogeneity as analyzed in Chien et al. (2007). In our production
economy, we incorporate the labor decision for shareholders and bondholders in all versions
to maintain comparability over di¤erent models. Excluding the labor choice for these agents
would make it easier to t the asset pricing moments, as the labor choice o¤ers shareholders
another channel to smooth uctuations in marginal utility.
2.1 Households
There are three di¤erent types of households in our model economy: shareholders, bondhold-
ers and workers. The types of households di¤er in the way they participate in the nancial
market, in the way they insure against macroeconomic risk and in their preferences toward
risk and intertemporal substitution. All agents maximize expected utility, which depends
positively on consumption and negatively on the amount of labor supplied.
Type 1 Agents: Shareholders
Shareholders are able to invest both in stocks and bonds. They choose the amount of working
hours (N1;t) they supply at the prevailing spot market wage rate (W st ). The decision problem
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for these shareholders is thus:
maxEt
1X
j=0
tU1 (C1;t+j; N1;t+j) (1)
subject to the requirement:
C1;t + P
B
t B1;t+1 + P
S
t S1;t+1 6 B1;t + S1;t
 
P St +Dt

+W st N1;t +  t (2)
In words, the shareholdersbudget constraint states that their expenditures on consump-
tion (C1;t), bonds (B1;t+1) and stocks (S1;t+1), cannot exceed total income. Bonds are sold
at a price PBt , while shares trade at price P
S
t . In addition to labor income (W
s
t N1;t), share-
holders obtain funds from previous bond holdings (B1;t), from stock holdings (S1;tP St ) and
through dividend payments by the rms (S1;tDt) and the nancial intermediary ( t, see be-
low). This maximization problem results in the standard FOC. In particular, they mimic the
well known conditions for consumption, labor and asset holdings in a standard representative
agent model.1 The stochastic discount factor of the shareholders is also used to price long
term real bonds.2
1In particular, these are:
@U1 (C1;t; N1;t)
@C1;t
  1;t = 0
@U1 (C1;t; N1;t)
@N1;t
+ 1;t
W st
Pt
= 0
Et

1;t+1
1;t
1
PBt

= Et

1;t+1
1;t
Rft+1

= 1
Et

1;t+1
1;t
(PSt+1 +Dt+1)
PSt

= Et

1;t+1
1;t
RSt+1

= 1:
2We consider decaying coupon perpetuities as in Rudebusch and Swanson (2008).
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Type 2 Agents: Bondholders
Bondholders do not hold any shares in their portfolio. Bondholders also di¤er from share-
holders in that their momentary utility function is characterized by a higher degree of risk
aversion, but they are otherwise very similar. In particular, the type 2 agents also work at
the spot wage and thus maximize:
maxEt
1X
j=0
tU2 (C2;t+j; N2;t+j) (3)
subject to:
C2;t +
PBt B2;t+1
(B2;t+1)
6 B2;t +W st N2;t (4)
Bondholders engage in bond accumulation via a nancial intermediary. In doing so, they
are subject to a portfolio cost (B2;t+1). We introduce such a cost for bond holdings so that
the return on bonds will depend on the macro bond supply. The more bondholders save, the
lower the return. The more debt they accumulate, the higher the cost. This cost is taken as
given from the point of view of an individual bondholder. This mechanism is the same as in
Benigno (2009) who uses it in a two-country model. The introduction of such an intermedi-
ation margin is necessary to avoid innite bond holdings or borrowing. This assumption has
very similar consequences as the discrete constraints on bond positions as imposed in, e.g.,
Guvenen (2009). The latter setup cannot be used when applying perturbation methods to
solve the model, as we do below. For su¢ ciently small values of the elasticity of the bond
price to the overall bond holdings, this bond holding cost has a negligible e¤ect on the sav-
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ings decisions of bondholders and on the risk premiums in the model.3 The intermediation
prots made by the nancial intermediary  t are rebated to the shareholders.
Type 3 Agents: Workers
The third type of agents also derive utility from consumption and labor, with felicity function
U3(:).
maxEt
1X
j=0
tU3 (C3;t+j; N3;t+j) (5)
The main di¤erence from the other types of agents is that workers do not participate in
nancial markets at all and cannot accumulate wealth. As a result, these agents consume
their entire labor income each period:
C3;t = W
c
tN3;t (6)
We assume that workers engage in long-term labor contracts with the rms.4 ;5 The workers
earn a contract wage (W ct ). In exchange they deliver the e¢ cient labor input to the rms.
3The bond portfolio cost, in fact, generally does not have a signicant impact on the risk premium
statistics reported below. In principle, the introduction of the borrowing cost can generate a (rst order)
term premium of its own, from the bondholder perspective. Throughout, all reported nancial prices are
based on the shareholder stochastic discount factor. As an indication of how small the calibrated borrowing
cost is in that regard, in a rst order approximation to the model for our baseline calibration the term
premium is essentially zero, as it never exceeds 3  10 10:
4See Gomme and Greenwood (1995) and Boldrin and Horvath (1995) for a detailed discussion of labor
contracts between workers and entrepreneurs in an RBC model. We have expiremented with alternative
contract setups. The implications for the labor supply are very similar. To save space we do not report these
results in the paper.
5An alternative assumption to the permanent relations is that the worker-rm relation takes the form of
a one-period contract: this contract will guarantee an expected relative marginal utility level to the workers.
If workers have no bargaining power, then this expected relative utility will be equal to the expected outcome
in the spot market. If workers have some bargaining power the wage will guarantee something extra relative
to the market outcome. This contract setup is similar to the one considered in Boldrin and Horvath (1995).
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The wage contract solves:
maxEt f$tU1 (C1;t; N1;t) + (1 $t)U3 (C3;t; N3;t)g (7)
where $t measures the bargaining weight of the shareholder, and the optimization is
subject to the budget constraint of the workers and the shareholders. The contract is sum-
marized by the following two conditions:
UC1;t = tU
C
3;t with t =
(1 $t)
$t
(8)
W st =  
UN3;t
UC3;t
In the rst condition the ratio between the two marginal utilities reects the relative
bargaining power of the two parties in the contract arrangement. The shareholders guarantee
a consumption level to the workers that implies a constant relative marginal utility. The
contract wage thus guarantees an optimal risk sharing between workers and shareholders
on a period-by-period basis for a given realization of the exogenous bargaining weight t.
With a xed value of , the contract provides optimal insurance against aggregate risk and
reproduces the same outcome as the exchange of contingent securities (constant relative
marginal utilities), at given wealth distribution.6 This setup is also considered in Danthine
and Donaldson (2002) who assume, however, that labor supply is exogenous. Relative to
the outcome under a spot labor market, the contract wage contains an insurance premium
through which workers exchange risk with the marginal shareholder of the rms. Given the
6In particular, the contract then ensures
UC1;t
UC3;t
=
UC1;t+1
UC3;t+1
= (1 $)$ :
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high risk aversion (or low IES) of the workers, the contract wage guarantees them a smooth
consumption stream.
Descriptive realism aside (see Danthine and Donaldson, 2002 for more on this), the wage
contract has implications consistent with macro-nancial data. Given workersdemand for
smooth consumption, the contract wage will be fairly stable. Real wage stickiness, by itself,
is consistent with macro data, and can also help in generating nancial risk premiums, as
documented by Uhlig (2007). Here, the contract generates a countercyclical labor share and
more volatile and highly procyclical prots, which will help in generating risk premiums.
The e¢ cient contract wage has only distributive e¤ects, and does not create any allocative
distortion. In exchange for the insurance provided by the rm, workers o¤er the required
labor services to the rm. This means that workers will supply labor up to the point where
their marginal rate of substitution between labor and consumption is equal to the spot wage,
the second condition in (8).7
Finally, following Danthine and Donaldson (2002), we consider  to be a time-varying
process, driven by exogenous shocks to the bargaining power. We will refer to these shocks
as distribution risk where:
log(t) = (1  ) log() +  log(t 1) + "t : (9)
7In our steady state, we assume that the optimal contract implies a wage and consumption level for
the workers that is equivalent to the steady state outcome under the spot labor market. Alternatively, one
could also assume that workers have some extra bargaining power, which would result in a consumption
level above the spot market outcome. This would imply a lower level of dividends and consumption for the
shareholders and at the same time a higher volatility in their dividends/consumption stream (implying a
higher risk premium).
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Utility Function
In the baseline version of the model, we use the Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988,
henceforth GHH) utility specication for all three agents:
GHH : Ui (Ci;t; Ni;t) =
(Ci;t    iNi;t)1 i
1  i (10)
We assume that i, which we will refer to as the risk aversion with respect to con-
sumption, di¤ers between shareholders and the two other types of agents. The agents that
participate freely in the nancial market are assumed to be less risk averse. Our utility
function imposes the exact inverse relation between the risk aversion and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (IES): shareholders are assumed to be characterized by a higher
IES. This assumption is in line with the empirical evidence on heterogeneity across di¤erent
agents (e.g., Vissing-Jørgensen, 2002).
2.2 Firms
Firms maximize the present value of the dividend stream using the shareholdersstochastic
discount factor:
maxEt
"
1P
j=0
j
t+j
t
Dt+j(i)
#
(11)
with
Dt(i) =
2664 Yt (i) W st N1;t(i) W st N2;t(i) W ctN3;t(i)
 It(i) +

P
Bf
t Bf;t(i) Bf;t 1(i)

3775 (12)
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subject to:
Yt (i) = ZtKt(i)
Nt(i)
(1 ) (13)
Kt+1 (i) = (1  )Kt (i) +G

It (i)
Kt (i)

Kt (i) (14)
Nt (i) = N1;t (i) +N2;t (i) +N3;t (i) : (15)
Firms operate in competitive product markets and are identical, such that we can ignore
the index i. Dividends are dened as total income minus the wage bill (spot wage plus
insurance component), minus investment expenditures and plus the net receipts from debt
nancing. Note that the insurance the rms provide to the workers does not a¤ect the
allocation decisions of the rm. Firms thus take a static labor demand decision for the
remaining labor inputs which are hired at the spot labor market, and an intertemporal
investment decision. Firms use a standard Cobb-Douglas production function, and have
a one period nancial debt which is a constant fraction of the steady state capital stock
(Bf;t = Kss)8. Finally, the adjustment costs for capital are formulated as
G = a1

I
K
(1 1=)
+ a2: (16)
Firms are a¤ected by standard aggregate productivity shocks Zt, where:
log(Zt) = (1  z) log(Z) + z log(Zt 1) + "zt : (17)
8We retain a role for nancial leverage, as it is introduced by Guvenen (2009) as well as Danthine and
Donaldson (2002).
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The innovations to the productivity process and the distribution process are allowed to
be correlated as discussed in the estimation of the model below.
2.3 Equilibrium
Goods Market Clearing Condition:
The production by the rms is equal to aggregate demand:
Yt = C1;t + C2;t + C3;t + It: (18)
Bond Market Clearing Condition:
Given that there is no government debt in our model, the bond positions of bond and
shareholders must add up to the debt issued by the rms:
B1;t +B2;t = Bf;t: (19)
All debt is in the form of one period discount bonds. Long term bonds are in zero net
supply, and the stochastic discount factor of the shareholders is used to price these bonds.
Equity Market Clearing Condition:
In equilibrium the shareholders will own the entire net present value of the rm P st .
Therefore St, the share of the rm that the shareholders own, must be equal to 1 in equilib-
rium.
S1t = St = 1 (20)
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Labor Market Clearing Condition:
N1;t +N2;t +N3;t = Nt (21)
2.4 Baseline Parameterization
<<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>>
We use the parameter values in Table 1 for the baseline model. The discount factor () is
set at 0.99. The depreciation rate () is 2.5% per quarter. The capital adjustment costs are a
function of the change in the capital stock with an elasticity () set at 0.50. The parameter in
the Cobb-Douglas production function () is equal to (0.30). The values for these parameters
are standard in the literature. The nancial intermediation costs that bondholders face are a
linear function of their bond holdings with a small sensitivity of 0.00005. This guarantees that
the e¤ective interest rate that bondholders face will never deviate more than 12.5% from the
market interest rate in the baseline model. This parameter also generates a realistic wealth
distribution in the baseline model. Firm debt is assumed to be 30% of the capital stock.
More important for our application are the functional form and the parameters of the
utility function. Under the baseline specication with GHH preferences, we assume a risk
aversion with respect to consumption () of 10 for the workers and the bondholders, and
4 for the shareholders. Within a standard expected utility context, these values imply
an intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) of respectively 0.1 and 0.25. The Frisch
elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages is assumed to be equal to 1.33 for all agents
( = 1:75), and  is chosen so that hours worked for all agents is the same and scaled at 1.
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The shares of the di¤erent agent classes in total population are xed so that workers make
up 60%, bondholders 30% and shareholders 10% of the total population. The fraction of the
workers reects the share of the population which is engaged in a labor contract with the
rms. The remaining 40% can be thought of as the self-employed or entrepreneurs who do
not benet from a standard labor contract, but earn a spot wage that reects their marginal
productivity.
2.5 Estimation of the Stochastic Structure
Given these structural parameters, we estimate the stochastic processes for aggregate produc-
tivity and distribution risk implied by the model (see Equations 9 and 17). The estimation is
based on US data for GDP, consumption, investment, real wages (all expressed per capita)
and hours worked over the period 1947q3-2009q1.9 We use the log di¤erence of the data
(not for hours) as observables and estimate a common deterministic growth rate for these
four series. As we use ve data series and identify only two structural shocks, we also allow
for i.i.d. measurement errors on the ve observed variables. The model is estimated using
a full information Bayesian estimation methodology. All parameters are estimated with a
narrow posterior distribution interval. Table 2 summarizes the results for the parameters of
the stochastic processes. These values correspond to the mode of the posterior distribution.
Detailed results of the estimation are presented in the Appendix.
The results for the productivity process are standard with a rst order autocorrelation
of 0.944 and a standard deviation for "zt of 0.64%. The distribution process, that determines
9Estimation of both the structural parameters and the stochastic shocks requires a more complete speci-
cation of the model, including additional nominal and real frictions and a complete set of structural shocks.
Such an exercise is beyond the scope of this paper.
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the bargaining power of workers and rms in the contract wage, has a higher persistence
(0.987) and a standard deviation for "t of 2.53%. The data strongly prefer a negative
correlation (-0.54) between these two innovations. Our interpretation for this correlation is
that productivity shocks have a signicant e¤ect on the distribution of income: in particular
the labor share in total output drops systematically, and according to the estimates also in
a very persistent way, following a positive productivity shock. This result is in line with
the general nding that wages are highly rigid either in nominal or in real terms. This is
also consistent with the drop in the wage share or the real marginal cost after a positive
productivity shock.10 Usually, this wage rigidity is introduced in the models by some ad hoc
assumption on the stickiness of wages or some multi-period wage contract. In our model,
the wage rigidity is the outcome of an e¢ cient labor contract between workers and the rms
(or their shareholders). As pointed out in Danthine and Donaldson and discussed later on,
this correlation between the two sources of risk is important for the risk premium.
The two structural shocks explain a high fraction of the overall volatility in the observed
variables (ranging between 60% and 80% for the growth rates). As we do not explain 100%
of the volatility, we will rescale the standard deviations of the two innovations upward with
25% when calculating the risk premiums implied by the model. Without such rescaling, the
model would logically underestimate the risk premium as we capture only part of the risk
in the economy. This approach assumes that the two structural shocks, that are explicitly
considered in the model, are representative for the other unobserved shocks in the economy
in terms of their contribution to the risk premium.11
10See Rios-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2008) for a discussion of the distributive consequences of TFP
shocks.
11In a previous version of this paper, we also considered nominal rigidities and demand shocks. It turned
out that the demand shocks contributed indeed signicantly to the risk premium.
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<<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>>
3 Model Results
We discuss the overall statistics of the model both for the real and the nancial side of the
economy and we compare these results to the data statistics. Next, we turn to the analysis
of the risk sharing arrangements in the model.
3.1 Overall Statistics of the Model
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the overall statistics of the baseline three-agent model (T1+T2+T3).
One should not expect the model to t the data moments exactly: in reality more shocks are
present and additional nominal and real frictions will a¤ect the transmission of the shocks.
The main objective is not to t the data in all dimensions, but rather to illustrate that
the model with heterogeneous agents improves signicantly on the representative agent case
in the desired direction compared to the data. The representative agent version is one in
which only shareholders (T1) are present in the economy but all other parameters remain
the same (the distribution risk is not active in that economy and risk aversion is kept at 4).
The results in Tables 3 and 4 are based on the unconditional moments of a second order
approximation of the model.
<<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>>
<<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE>>
Overall, the baseline model with three types of heterogeneous agents ts the data well
both in terms of real and nancial statistics. That the model matches the real statistics is not
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a surprise given that we estimated its stochastic structure on the main aggregate variables.
From that perspective, the reported model statistics conrm the relative success of the model
t.12 The nancial moments were not used in the estimation, and these moments provide
therefore a very strong validity test for the model.
In terms of the real statistics, the model reproduces the observed aggregate output volatil-
ity by construction through the scaling of the innovations (1.72%). Hours worked are less
volatile compared to the data (0.98 versus 1.34), but the model reproduces the high corre-
lation between total hours and output. The consumption volatility is too high (1.34 versus
1.17), while investment is not su¢ ciently volatile (3.30 versus 4.94). Both demand com-
ponents display an excessive correlation with output. Decreasing the capital adjustment
costs can improve these real statistics but would reduce the risk premiums also. Another
explanation is the very persistent nature of the two structural shocks that we consider and
the fact that we disregard the less persistent shocks that were captured by the measurement
errors in our estimation procedure. Simply lowering the persistence of the structural shocks
improves the relative volatility and lowers the correlations with output, but this has a cost
in terms of the nancial statistics. Results would improve on both sides if we allow for
the additional, less persistent sources of risk in the model. For instance, the introduction
of investment-specic technology shocks or shocks to nancial frictions, suggested in recent
literature as important alternative sources of volatility, could increase the volatility of invest-
ment and reduce the variation and the procyclical nature of consumption. Real wages and
the wage share behave very much in line with the data, both in terms of volatility and cycli-
12We disregard the measurement errors in this exercise and rescale the variance of the two structural
shocks so that the model can still match exactly with the volatility of aggregate output.
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cal behavior: real wages are smooth and acyclical, while the wage share is relatively volatile
and behaves countercyclically. We consider these last results as very important features of
the model, since the income distribution plays a crucial role for the volatility of the capital
returns and therefore also for the pricing of the underlying assets.
On the nancial side, the model is able to generate an important risk premium both for
equity (EP = 5:18) and for the holding period return on a 10-year bond (BP = 2:34). For
the bond, this excess holding period return corresponds with a yield spread (y40   Rf) of
1.81. The model generates a risk free real rate (Rf) of 1.26% with a standard deviation of
1.98. The volatility of the return to equity is 22.18, which yields a Sharpe ratio (SR) of
0.24. These statistics are close to the observed data averages. We slightly underestimate
the equity risk premium and the SR, while we tend to overestimate the spread in the bond
returns. In sum, the model passes relatively successfully the validity test on the nancial
moments.
The baseline model generates the following wealth distribution: 85% of nancial assets
are held by the top 10% of the population that consists of shareholders, 15% of nancial
wealth is held by the next 30% of the population that is represented by the bondholders, and
0% is held by the workers. The shareholdings are -by denition- concentrated in the rst
group. This distribution implies a concentration of wealth and stock market participation
that is very similar to the one typically measured in the US wealth distribution (see, e.g.,
Wol¤, 2006).13 In the model, the shareholdersnancial portfolio consists of 93% stocks and
7% bonds.
13Over the last two decades, there has been an increasing share of the population that participates in the
stock market. An interesting extension of the paper would be to analyze the implications of this increase in
stock market participation for the risk premium.
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The relative contributions of heterogeneity and distribution risk across agents become
clear when we compare these outcomes with versions of the model in which only one or two
types of agents are present. When only type 1 agents are present, the model reduces to
the standard representative agent (RA) model. In such a setup only aggregate productivity
risk matters as distribution shocks are not active. The failure of the representative agent
model to explain the observed risk premiums in a model with endogenous capital and labor
decisions is documented widely in the literature (see, e.g., Jermann, 1998; Lettau and Uhlig,
2000; Boldrin et al., 2001; Uhlig, 2007; ...). The risk premium on equity (0.87%) remains
small because aggregate consumption is relatively smooth and the return on equity displays
only modest volatility. The same applies for the risk premium on bonds (0.54%) and the
term spread (0.34%) because the volatility in interest rates and bond prices remains low.
So both the price of risk, determined by the volatility in marginal utility, and the amount
of risk, depending on the volatility in the returns, are insu¢ cient to generate the observed
risk premiums. The fact that the RA model still generates a non-negligible risk premium
is mainly explained by the GHH-preferences, so that labor supply is not e¤ectively used to
smooth consumption further, and the assumption of a substantial risk aversion (equal to 4
for Type 1 agents).
These results do not change much when we introduce a distinction between bondholders
and shareholders (T1+T2). Here we assume that bondholders make up 80% of the house-
holds and that their utility function is characterized by a lower elasticity of intertemporal
substitution (0.1) than for the shareholders (0.25). Both types of agents supply labor at the
competitive wage, such that only aggregate risk matters as in the RA model. The lower IES
implies that bondholders value smooth consumption more than the shareholders. Aggregate
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consumption becomes smoother compared to the RA-case, but the consumption of share-
holders is more volatile than consumption of bondholders. In periods of high productivity,
the additional savings decrease the risk free interest rate more which induces higher equity
prices and a stronger increase in investment. The volatility in shareholdersconsumption,
the interest rate and the return to equity is, however, not su¢ cient to lift the risk premiums
considerably.
Heterogeneity between workers and shareholders and a labor contract that is a¤ected by
both productivity and distribution risk produce much stronger e¤ects. This becomes clear
when we look at the results from a model with only these two types of agents, again in a
proportion of 80% and 20%. Two additional mechanisms explain this result. First, consider
the case in which there is only aggregate productivity risk (T1+T3 ("z)): this means that we
eliminate the e¤ect of productivity shocks on the bargaining power of workers/shareholders
in the labor contract and also disregard any additional independent distribution risk. Under
these assumptions, the macrovariables behave the same in the model with workers and an
e¢ cient labor contract, as in the model with bondholders and bond trade (T1+T2). But
the labor contract implies a redistribution of wealth between workers and shareholders.14
After a positive productivity shock workers moderate their wage claims in order to smooth
their consumption. As a result, the wage share declines. Shareholders -who benet from the
higher income from capital- increase their consumption more. Therefore, the labor contract
induces additional volatility both in the return to equity and in shareholdersconsumption.
As a consequence, with productivity risk alone, the model with workers and shareholders
14At least when considering a positive productivity shock in isolation; with ongoing worker-rm relations
these e¤ects will largely cancel out over time and result in an average contract wage that is lower than the
average spot wage in the stochastic steady state.
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produces a risk premium of 1.64%. This is markedly higher than the model with bondholders
but still far below the empirically observed risk premium.
Next, we introduce distribution risk in the labor contract, without allowing for the esti-
mated correlation between the two sources of risk (T1+T3 ("z;")). Distribution risk raises
the volatility in the real wage and the wage share. Clearly, this has important implications
for the nancial side as both the return to equity and the consumption of shareholders be-
come much more volatile. Indeed, the risk premium on equity and the SR increase to 4.41%
and 0.22, respectively.
When positive aggregate productivity shocks also induce a lower bargaining for workers
in the labor contract (T1+T3 ("z;";)), as we estimated in the overall model, the risk
premium on equity goes up to 6.72% and overshoots the empirically observed premium. The
highly countercyclical real wage and wage share are clearly responsible for this outcome as
sources of additional volatility in the shareholder stochastic discount factor and the return
to capital. The volatility and, especially, the persistence in the short rate makes bond prices
also excessively volatile, so that the model term premium becomes very high.
3.2 Risk Sharing across Agents
In a model with heterogeneous agents and a complete market of contingent claims, one
can easily show that the optimal risk sharing between agents results in a constant relative
marginal utility:
UCi;t
UCj;t
=
UCi;t+1
UCj;t+1
=  (22)
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where i and j index agent types (= 1; 2; 3 and i 6= j) and  depends on the relative wealth
of the two agents. In our setup, there are no contingent claims and we also assume that type
2 and type 3 agents have no access to the stock market. Instead, we consider two alternative
risk sharing arrangements: the bond market and the labor contract. Figure 1 summarizes
the consumption/savings decision of the di¤erent agents in case of a positive productivity
shock. The impulse response functions (IRF) are based on a rst order approximation of
the model around a steady state in which the bondholders have zero net bond holdings. For
all three agents the higher current and expected income increases their wealth and drives
up their consumption. In addition to the impulse response in the baseline model, the gure
plots the quantitative e¤ect of the di¤erent channels of risk sharing.
The Bond Market
Type 2 agentsonly recourse to smooth their marginal utility is the bond market. By selling
and buying bonds to/from the shareholders, these two types of agents will try to achieve the
equalization of their relative marginal utilities over time.15
Bondholders have a relatively low IES and therefore a strong desire to smooth con-
sumption. Consequently, following a positive productivity shock they will save part of the
increased income. Given the xed supply of bonds by the rms, shareholders will have to
absorb this supply of funds. Shareholders will be eager to do so and raise their consumption
plans given their higher IES. It follows that the risk sharing through the bond market be-
15The bond market provides only an imperfect risk sharing device for the bondholders as they are con-
fronted with an e¤ective interest rate that will deviate from the market rate: the nancial intermediation
margin depends on their net wealth position and imposes the intertemporal consumption constraint on their
consumption decision. As mentioned before, the magnitude of this cost does not a¤ect the quantative results
presented in the paper.
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tween type 1 and type 2 agents increases the volatility of shareholdersconsumption, which
will tend to increase the risk premium relative to an economy in which these agents are not
allowed to trade in the bond market.
This conclusion is qualitatively similar to the results obtained by Guvenen (2009). How-
ever, the IRFs clearly indicate that the size of this bond trade (=savings, the di¤erence
between the black solid and dashed lines in the middle panel of Figure 1) remains very
limited in our model. It is interesting to note that the bond trade between bondholders
and shareholders is smaller in the model with three agents and distribution risk than in
the model with shareholders and bondholders only. In this last model, the reaction of the
bond trade is four times bigger than in the IRF reported in Figure 1. When we use the
calibration of Guvenen for the productivity shock, in his model with exogenous labor, the
bond trade becomes even ten times larger and the associated risk premium increases to 4%.
So while the mechanism of Guvenen surely has the potential to generate substantial risk
premiums, it does not in our more general setup, for our estimated stochastic structure. The
reason for this limited bond trading in the complete model is that shareholder income will
rise substantially more as a consequence of the wage moderation that results from the labor
contract. Therefore, shareholders will be more reluctant to absorb the additional savings
from the bondholders. As a result, interest rates will decrease further and bondholders will
nd it optimal to raise consumption more and save less. So the income redistribution e¤ects
present in the three-agent model o¤set the importance of the bond trade mechanism that is
central to the Guvenen model.
<<FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE>>
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The Labor Contract
Figure 1 also shows the impact of the insurance premium on workers and shareholders
consumption following a positive productivity shock. The contract wage will increase less
than the spot wage, meaning that the insurance premium received by the workers is negative.
This helps to stabilize the consumption of the workers. The opposite holds of course for the
shareholders, who receive the additional dividends of the rms. Their consumption volatility
would be much less outspoken without the labor contract. Danthine and Donaldson (2002)
refer to this mechanism as the operational leverage, in analogy with the rm debt service
that generates nancial leverage.
Figure 1 also illustrates the outcome of a productivity shock for consumption in the
model in which the distributive e¤ects of a productivity shock are absent. Without this
correlation, the volatility of shareholder consumption is more in line with that of the other
agents. Recall that this correlation between productivity and distribution risk reinforces the
decline in the wage share following the positive productivity shock, in line with the observed
evidence in the data. The fact that workers get a smaller piece of the (bargaining) pie in
a boom implies that prots become more procyclical. The correlation translates into more
volatile, procyclical shareholder consumption.
In sum, the contract wage and the redistributive e¤ects of a productivity shock both
contribute to smoothing workers labor income and consumption. In doing so, they also
exacerbate the cyclical reaction of shareholdersconsumption. Therefore, both mechanisms
help to increase the risk premium in the model.
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4 Sensitivity Analysis of the Model
Here we analyze how sensitive the results are to changes in di¤erent aspects of the model.
We consider the sensitivity to the stochastic structure, the choice of the functional form of
the utility functions, the important structural parameters, the heterogeneity in preferences
among di¤erent agents.
4.1 The Stochastic Structure
The role of the di¤erent sources of risk was discussed in the previous section for the model
in which only workers and shareholders are present. These conclusions generally also apply
to the complete model with three agents (but with some additional insights). Tables 5 and
6 summarize the results.
<<TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE>>
<<TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE>>
Aggregate productivity shocks, distribution shocks and the correlation between these two
shocks contribute equally to the risk premium for equity, but distribution risk is less impor-
tant for the bond premium. Productivity risk is the main source of variation in the short rate
and in the main macro aggregates. Aggregate productivity has some distributional e¤ects
through the contract wage, but without the additional distribution risk this is insu¢ cient
to explain the wage share volatility or to generate su¢ cient volatility in the equity returns.
Distribution risk as such a¤ects aggregate output only marginally, but it is crucial to match
the wage statistics. The absence of intertemporal reallocations explains its weak e¤ect on
the short rate and therefore also on the bond premium.
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Persistence in the exogenous processes, especially in the distribution process, is impor-
tant to generate larger risk premiums, while it entails more volatility in the short rate. With
less persistence in the shocks, consumption smoothing generates larger savings ows. Con-
sequently, interest rates have to adjust more in order to induce rms to adjust their capital
accumulation accordingly.
4.2 The Utility Specication
In the baseline model, we retained the GHH utility function for describing the preferences of
the three types of agents. This choice of the utility function deserves some more discussion
because it is crucial for the joint dynamics of the real and the nancial decisions in the
model. Its importance derives from the fact that marginal utility enters both in the stochastic
discount factor for asset pricing and in the labor supply decision.
In the comparison of the heterogeneous agent model with a representative agent model,
we also consider two alternative utility functions. In particular, the standard separable utility
function and the King, Plosser and Rebelo preferences (1988, henceforth KPR) are specied
as:16
16Our choice for these utility functions is motivated by the following considerations. First, they allow us
to assess the e¤ect of non-separability rigorously, as we will document below. Second, the KPR specication
is consistent with a balanced growth path, which is a desirable feature for future extensions of the model,
and for taking the model to the data more rigorously. Third, one can interpret the GHH utility function as
one limit case of Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009, JR) preferences, with KPR utility being on the other end of
the spectrum. JR preferences are specied as Ut =
(Ct  Nt Xt)1 
1  where Xt = C

t X
(1 )
t 1 , with 0 <  < 1.
The interpretation of GHH preferences as an extreme case of JR preferences, with  ! 0; responds to the
critique that GHH preferences are inconsistent with a balanced growth path. It implies that the wealth e¤ect
on labor supply is realized only very slowly over time, but in the long run this wealth e¤ect exactly o¤sets
the substitution e¤ect on labor supply. The cases we checked with JR utility, typically gave intermediate
results between KPR ( = 0) and GHH ( = 1), so we restrict our analysis to these two limit cases.
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SEP : Ut =
Ct
1 
1      
Nt

(23)
KPR : Ut =
(Ct(1   Nt ))1 
1   : (24)
To focus ideas, let us start from the case of a representative agent with a CRRA utility
function and separability between consumption and labor.17 The equity premium (EPAt )
can be written as:
EPAt =  rs;rs
= rs;crsc (25)
where  and rs stand for the risk aversion and the return on stocks,  = t+1 t, t =
@U(Ct)
@Ct
= UCt , and x and x denote the (conditional) standard deviation and correlation,
respectively. The corresponding Sharpe ratio (SRAt ) is:
SRAt =  rs;
= rs;cc (26)
The price of risk depends on the volatility of consumption growth, on the correlation
between consumption and the return on capital, and on the degree of risk aversion.
The agent also has the opportunity to adjust her labor supply to smooth uctuations in
17There are numerous variations on this basic representative agent framework, and our goal is not to
provide a detailed overview (see, e.g., Kocherlakota, 1996). Rather, we here focus on the role of introducing
the labor decision.
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marginal utility. The linearized rst order condition relates the supply of labor to real wages
and consumption:
(  1)n^t = w^t   c^t (27)
Following a positive productivity shock, the increase in consumption, ceteris paribus, lowers
the marginal utility of the real wage, which reduces labor supply. The reduction in working
hours, in turn, mitigates the initial expansionary e¤ects of the productivity shock. As a
result, the rise in both marginal productivity (and thus the stock return rs) and consump-
tion (and thus volatility of marginal utility ) will be smaller. Increasing the degree of
risk aversion, which can contribute to the risk premium in a model with exogenous labor,
will induce a more intensive utilization of the labor supply to smooth consumption.18 The
analytical expressions above reveal that there is no hope of improving asset pricing implica-
tions by allowing for endogenous labor in a separable utility framework. Moreover, in terms
of macro implications, these results do not yield the observed positive correlation between
labor inputs and output.
The introduction of non-separability between labor and consumption in the utility func-
tion strongly a¤ects the models macro and nancial responses. The corresponding Sharpe
ratio becomes (see, e.g., Uhlig, 2007):
SRt = rs;cccc   rs;ncn;nn (28)
where cc =  UCCCUC is the relative risk aversion with respect to consumption. The
18Even in a model with exogenous labor, a higher degree of risk aversion is not an option for solving the
equity premium puzzle as it generates the so-called risk free rate puzzle.
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cross-derivative cn;n measures the degree of non-separability in the utility function: cn;n =
UCNN
UC
> 0 (complements) < 0 (substitutes):
The rst term in (28) implies that the price of risk increases with the correlation between
consumption and stock returns, the risk aversion, and the volatility of consumption growth.
This is the traditional mechanism also at work in the representative agent model with exoge-
nous labor and separable utility. Non-separability leads to an additional e¤ect depending on
the volatility of labor supply, the cross-derivative of marginal utility with respect to hours
worked, and the correlation between hours worked and the return on equity. The sign of
this term depends on the cross-derivative and the correlation. Both correlation terms in the
Sharpe ratio are generally high and positive.
On the macro side, the linearized FOC for labor supply can be written as:
(cc + nc;c)bct   (nn + cn;n)n^t = bwt (29)
Equation (29) shows that the strength of the income and substitution e¤ects on labor
supply are also controlled by the cross-derivatives of the utility function to its respective
arguments. This means that introducing non-separabilities in utility does not just buy
some free parameters to scale up asset pricing moments, such as the Sharpe ratio. By
contrast, we impose discipline on the exercise by examining a selection of both nancial and
macroeconomic moments. To aid intuition, Table 7 below summarizes the implied elasticities
for each of the three preference specications we consider.
<<TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE>>
The analytical expressions in the rst two rows of the table help to evaluate the Sharpe
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ratio, while the lower two rows are crucial to determine the labor supply reaction. The
cross-derivative terms a¤ect both the SR in Equation (28) and the labor supply decision in
Equation (29). Under KPR and GHH utility, consumption and labor are complements (see
Table 7: cn;n = (  1) > 0 under KPR and cn;n =   1 > 0 under GHH). In other words,
agents will prefer positive comovement between consumption and labor, and the negative
income e¤ect on labor supply (cc + nc;c) is reduced to 1 under KPR preferences, while the
e¤ect drops to zero under GHH preferences. However, if hours worked become procyclical,
so that the correlation rs;n is positive, and the cross-derivative is positive, then the second
term in the SR in Equation (28) has a negative e¤ect on the price of risk. Hence, during
a recession -when marginal utility is high due to low consumption- the reduction in hours
worked will mitigate or even o¤set this increase in marginal utility.
In sum, non-separability can help by alleviating the strong income e¤ects at work in the
rst order condition for labor supply under separable utility. This will reduce the strong
countercyclical nature of employment, which reinforces the propagation of the productivity
shock. However, because labor and consumption are complements, their comovement will
also tend to stabilize marginal utility. This, in turn, limits the models ability to generate
signicant risk premiums. Given that GHH preferences overcome -at least to some extent-
the important problems of the separable utility function, we retain these preferences for
all our versions of the heterogeneous agents model that we consider in this paper (see also
Guvenen, 2009).
<<TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE>>
<<TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE>>
To illustrate this discussion we summarize in Tables 8 and 9 the results of the three
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utility functions for the representative agent version and the three-agent model. In the T1
(representative agent) model with separable utility and a risk aversion of 4, the labor supply
is used intensively to smooth the consumption stream. The endogenous labor decision implies
that labor supply is strongly countercyclical so that the overall volatility in the economy is
reduced. With a smooth consumption stream and a very low volatility in the return to
capital, there is no longer a reason to require high risk premiums. A non-separable utility
function goes a long way to overcome this problem even in a representative agent context.
This is especially the case with GHH preferences, where the labor supply condition is no
longer a¤ected by an income e¤ect. In that model, too, the volatility of the return to capital
increases considerably. However, compared to the baseline model, the T1-GHH model yields
a higher stochastic real rate and less volatility in the return on stocks. If we allow for a
higher risk aversion (10) for the representative agent, the results for the nancial statistics
improve, but problems remain in terms of explaining the acyclical nature of wages and the
variation in the wage share.
The results from the representative agent model carry over to the heterogeneous agent
model.19 In contrast to GHH preferences, the labor supply under SEP and KPR depends
on the consumption level, which implies that hours worked will react di¤erently to shocks
across agents. Heterogeneity improves the performance of the models for any specication
of the preferences.
19Note that in this comparison, we adjust the standard deviation of the distribution shock to make it
consistent with the marginal utility expressions. This occurs because the scale of the distribution risk,
estimated using GHH does not apply to either SEP or KPR. The rest of the stochastic structure is left
unchanged.
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4.3 The Structural Parameters
Tables 10 and 11 illustrate the impact of three important structural parameters of the model:
the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the capital adjustment costs and the nancial leverage
of rms. In the baseline model, the values for ,  and  were set at values that are quite
standard for calibrated models, but a large empirical uncertainty persists on these values.
We therefore show the sensitivity of the results to these values. In addition, this robustness
exercise helps to understand the model further.
<<TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE>>
<<TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE>>
An inelastic labor supply, higher capital adjustment costs and higher nancial leverage
can all contribute positively to the risk premiums, but each of them has a cost in at least
one other dimension.
In a rst exercise, we change the Frisch elasticity from 1.33 in the baseline case to 0.5
in the alternative scenario (this corresponds with values of  of 1.75 and 3). When labor
is made more inelastic, the model has trouble producing su¢ cient output volatility while
the wage volatility is overestimated. Aggregate consumption is also very smooth, but this
masks a higher volatility in the consumption of the di¤erent agents. This is possible be-
cause consumption of the di¤erent agents, and especially that of workers, is becoming less
procyclical. The reason is that distribution shocks exert stronger e¤ects on consumption
when labor is more inelastic. This follows from the fact that the second derivative of utility
with respect to consumption (cc) is a negative function of  under GHH preferences (see
Table 7). So in order to realize an exogenous change in the relative marginal utility, relative
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consumption now has to adjust by more. Stated di¤erently, with labor and consumption
appearing as complementary in marginal utility and as labor supply is used less to adjust
marginal utility, consumption has to adjust by more. The labor contract guarantees these
relative consumption streams and adjust the wage bill accordingly. It follows that the wage
and the wage share also become more volatile. With distribution shocks becoming relatively
more important, the model with inelastic labor still produces high risk premiums despite the
decline in aggregate volatility.
The e¤ect of higher capital adjustment costs ( = 0.3 instead of 0.5) is more standard.
With more costly adjustment, capital accumulation will be used less to smooth consumption
over time, and interest rates will have to move by more. Equity prices and returns uctuate
more reecting the value of the existing capital stock. Increasing the risk premium through
higher adjustment costs therefore implies a lower variability of investment and more variation
in the short rate.
Financial leverage a¤ects outcomes only via its impact on the dividends paid out to
shareholders. Shareholdersconsumption volatility, however, will be una¤ected. Their total
capital income remains unchanged because the additional bonds issued by rms are held by
these same shareholders, since the bondholders have no reason to adjust their holdings. It
follows that the equity premium is higher, but only through an excessive volatility in equity
returns; the Sharpe ratio is una¤ected.
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4.4 Heterogeneity across Agents
Our agents di¤er in two ways: they di¤er in participation in the capital market and in their
risk aversion. Here we analyze how important the second source of heterogeneity is for the
outcomes of the model. First, we consider a version of the model in which the risk aversion is
equal across all agents. In a next step, we consider an Epstein-Zin recursive utility structure,
and investigate whether it is the di¤erence in risk aversion or in intertemporal elasticity of
substitution that is important.
Tables 12 and 13 show that the outcomes do not change fundamentally when b;w is re-
duced from 10 to 4 in the GHH preferences of workers and bondholders. In this case, workers
desire to smooth their consumption stream is reduced, so that the optimal labor contract
will allow for more variation in the wage. The same argument applies to bondholders: as
a consequence these agents will trade less actively in the bond market. The result is less
variability in the risk free rate and in investment. But the nancial moments are not a¤ected
strongly: the premium on equity increases slightly while that for bonds decreases somewhat.
In sum, the main argument for preference heterogeneity and for a relatively high risk aver-
sion for workers is based on the improved match with the wage dynamics. These ndings
are in line with the conclusions of Danthine and Donaldson for their model with workers and
shareholders. However, it is opposite to the conclusion of Guvenen, who shows that a model
based on bond trade between bondholders and shareholders can only produce signicant risk
premiums with su¢ cient heterogeneity in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the
two agents.
Increasing s; the risk aversion for shareholders, from 4 to 10, so that all agents are
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characterized by the same high risk aversion, produces excellent statistics for the goods and
labor market, and increases the Sharpe Ratio to 0.32. However, this calibration exaggerates
the bond premium and the risk free rate volatility and leads to negative mean interest rates.
The preference heterogeneity in our baseline model avoids these last problems.
<<TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE>>
<<TABLE 13 ABOUT HERE>>
In our baseline model with expected utility, the parameter  reects both the risk aversion
and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (=1/) of agents. In order to di¤erentiate
between these two concepts, we analyze the outcomes of the model under recursive Epstein-
Zin preferences. In this setup agents maximize the following discounted value of current and
future utilities:
Ui;t =

(1  ) ui (Ci;t; Ni;t) + 

Et(Ui;t+1)
1 {i 1 i1 {i 11 i (30)
where { and  are now respectively the CRRA coe¢ cient and the inverse of the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution, and
ui (Ci;t; Ni;t) = (Ci;t    iNi;t)1 i : (31)
These preferences imply two major changes in the model equations: one related to the
agentsstochastic discount factor, another to the labor contract. The optimal labor contract
that reects optimal risk sharing among workers and shareholders can be represented as:
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@U3;t=@C3;t
@U1;t=@C1;t
=
@U3;t=@C3;t+1
@U1;t=@C1;t+1
(32)
In this setup, we analyze four alternative scenarios. First, we keep workersand bond-
holdersintertemporal elasticity of substitution at 0.1, but we decrease their risk aversion
to 4. The outcomes from this model are very similar to the outcomes in the baseline model
with 2;3 = 10 and 1 = 4. In a second exercise, we increase the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution for the workers and bondholders from 0.1 to 0.25, while keeping their risk
aversion at 10. Again, the outcomes appear very similar to the results with expected utility
and  = 4 for all agents. In a third simulation, we lower the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of the shareholders from 0.25 to 0.1, while maintaining their risk aversion at 4.
This model is basically equivalent to the outcomes with  = 10 for all agents in our stan-
dard expected utility setup. In sum, these ndings illustrate that it is the heterogeneity in
intertemporal elasticity of substitution which is important in our model, not the di¤erences
in risk aversion. The risk aversion of workers and bondholders have basically no impact
on the real economy or on the risk premiums. This last result is not very surprising: risk
aversion of workers and bondholders can only a¤ect the pricing of assets, which is based on
the stochastic discount factor of the shareholders, by changing their real allocation decision.
Only via this channel will shareholders change their evaluation of the asset prices. But it is
a standard result in a recursive utility setup that the risk aversion coe¢ cient does not a¤ect
the real decisions in a quantitatively important way. As a last experiment, we consider the
case where shareholders have an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of 0.25, but a risk
aversion of 10. This model produces again real outcomes that are similar to our baseline case,
but the risk premiums are increased considerably (RP=8.93 and BP=4.09). Risk aversion of
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the shareholders a¤ects asset pricing immediately via their stochastic discount factor while
keeping their real decisions unchanged at least up to rst order.
We conclude this sensitivity section by briey mentioning some variations on other as-
sumptions of the model. Reducing the share of the shareholders in the economy tends to
increase the risk premiums, especially if the share of the workers is increased as the counter-
balance. For instance, if shareholders make up only 5% of the population instead of 10%, and
workersweight is increased to 65%, the risk premium increases to 5.85. Similarly, reducing
the share of bondholders (from 20% to 15%) and increasing the shares of workers corre-
spondingly, increases the premium to 5.65. The main channel works through the broader
application of the wage contract, which tends to increase both the volatility of the returns
to capital and shareholders consumption. This mechanism also dominates if we assume that
the wage received by bondholders and shareholders is equal to the contract wage instead of
the spot wage (equal to marginal productivity of labor). On the other hand, dropping the
contract wage entirely and replacing it with the spot wage for all agents, reduces the risk pre-
miums back to the representative agent case (RP=0.80) as it implies a constant wage share
over the cycle. Liquidity constrained workers as such do not explain high risk premiums.
5 Decomposition of the Risk Premium for Equity and
Bond Returns
In the baseline model, the risk premium is signicantly higher for equity than for bonds
(5.18 for equity versus 2.34 for the excess holding period return on the 10 year bond). This
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di¤erence is explained by the di¤erence in the payout risk of both assets. In order to illustrate
this, it is helpful to decompose the risk premium related to any future income stream (dt+k)
in its two components: the covariance between the expected stochastic discount factor (SDF)
and the marginal utility of the shareholder on the one hand, and the covariance between the
future income stream and the marginal utility on the other (see Jermann (1998) for a more
detailed discussion of this decomposition).
RP (dt+k) =  cov(Et+1t+k   t+1; t+1)  cov(Et+1dt+k; t+1) (33)
The returns on bond and equity investments can be written as weighted sums of their
future income streams, and their risk premium can also be expressed as weighted averages
of the corresponding covariance terms. The contribution of the rst covariance term is
common to stocks and bonds and so any di¤erence in their premiums has to be explained by
di¤erences in the payout risk. For equity the payout risk is determined by the uncertainty
in the dividend stream. For a bond, the payout uncertainty is zero.20
Figure 2 provides more detail on the di¤erent components of the risk premium in the
baseline model. The left-hand panel displays the two covariance terms that appear in the
formula above, for the dividend stream at di¤erent horizons (expressed in quarters). The
stochastic discount factor component increases smoothly with the horizon, while the payout
premium falls for ows further in the future, reecting the prole in the response of the
dividend stream to the shocks. The payout risk is clearly dominant for the equity premium,
which is a weighted average of these covariance terms. The right-panel of Figure 2 provides the
20In the working paper version of this paper, we also consider ination and di¤erentiate between nominal
and real bonds. In that case, ination generates payout uncertainty for nominal bonds.
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same information for the bond premium. Here, the SDF uncertainty is the only determinant
of the premium for long horizon bonds.
<<FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE>>
The dividend stream is a¤ected by the operational leverage, which was discussed in the
previous sections, and by the nancial leverage that results from the debt nancing of rms:
the outstanding debt is assumed to remain a constant fraction of 30% of the capital stock.
This nancial leverage increases the volatility of dividends (after interest payments) and
therefore also the risk premium on equity, while leaving the SR una¤ected.
6 Time Variation in the Risk Premium
For analyzing average risk premiums, a second order approximation to the equilibrium con-
ditions is su¢ cient. Here, we are interested in time variation in the risk premium of the
model, and thus need to use at least one order of approximation higher than a second order
approximation. In this section we use a third order approximation to the equilibrium con-
ditions. We then simulate the model with the historical shocks for the productivity and the
distribution risk over the period 1947-2009.21
6.1 Cyclical Nature of Risk
Figure 3 shows the risk premiums generated by the model based on the historical series of
productivity and distribution shocks, along with NBER recessions. Table 14 measures the
comovement of the various (expected and realized) premiums with the business cycle as well
21We here use the estimated covariance structure of the shocks without rescaling in order to avoid any
inconsistency between the covariance parameters and the actual shock series.
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as their volatilities. Di¤erences in statistics relative to the earlier calibration results arise for
two main reasons: rst, the present results are based on a higher (third) order approximation.
Second, the results here are model outcomes based on the estimated historical shocks.
<<FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE>>
<<TABLE 14 ABOUT HERE>>
Figure 3 illustrates that the model generates quite some time variation in the equity and
bond premium. There is no immediate counterpart in the data for these expected return
series and related conditional moments. We compare our results to a number of proxies and
results of contemporary models. For equity, Brav et al. (2003) and Söderlind (2009) analyze
variations in ex ante measures of expected returns, based on analyst survey and options data.
The former obtain an average expected return Et(RSt+1) of around 20% for the period 1975-
2001. Söderlinds survey data suggest an average expected excess return Et(RSt+1   Rft ) of
about 3.25% while the conditional volatility of returns t(RSt+1) is around 16%. The average
of the model expected risk premium in Figure 3 is close to that of Söderlind. The conditional
standard deviation of the stock return t(RSt+1) in the model, plotted in Figure 5, is slightly
above 20% on average.
For bonds, the model produces an expected holding period return on nominal 10 year
bonds of 1.79 (Figure 3). The degree of time variation in expected excess bond returns
on bonds is limited (Table 14). Again, there are no immediate measures in the data to
compare these to. Relative to estimated models such as Du¤ee (2002), Dewachter (2008)
and Campbell et al. (2008) the magnitude of uctuations in expected returns is small. By
contrast, realized return average and volatility are substantial in the model and compare
well to -observable- measures of, e.g., Rudebusch and Swanson (2009) and Campbell et al.
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(2008). For instance, in Figure 3 and Table 14 (row 5) we measure the term premium by
the di¤erence in yield between the 10 year bond and its risk neutral counterpart (as in
Rudebusch and Swanson, 2009). We nd that in the present model, this measure for the
term premium is high on average (1.78), and substantially volatile (0.34). These numbers
establish that models with heterogeneous agents have the ability to resolve the bond premium
puzzle (Rudebusch and Swanson, 2008), in addition to the equity premium puzzle. Remark
that the model can simultaneously account for the two puzzles.
We now turn to the cyclical properties of these risk premiums. First of all, historically,
the patterns of time variation in the ex ante equity return survey measures of Söderlind
(2009) and Brav et al. (2003) look very similar to that of Figure 3. The dynamics of the
term premium, too, share the general time-series prole detected in other studies of the term
premium: a downward trend in risk premiums during the eighties and nineties. Di¤erent
from most estimates of the term premium (as summarized in Rudebusch et al., 2007), which
continue to fall throughout the early 2000s, the model term premium exhibits an upward
pattern starting in the late nineties.22 For conditional stock return volatility, the model
measure bears close resemblance to the implied option volatility calculated in Söderlind
(2009), with similar swings over the entire 1985-2007 period.
Second, expected returns are strongly countercyclical: the correlation of each of them
with linearly detrended output is around -0.8 to -0.9 (Table 14). Figure 3 shows how model
risk premiums increase at the onset of recession periods.
Third, realized returns do not share that same strong countercyclical pattern. For in-
stance, realized stock returns are procyclical, as output gains translate into larger divi-
22Remark that this comparison is based on a real concept in the model, and a nominal one in the data.
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dends/returns.
It is useful to try to understand the time variability of expected returns in the model a
bit further. We know from the results in Section 5 that, on average, payout risk is the largest
contributor to the equity premium. The bond premium is solely driven by SDF uncertainty,
and is therefore substantially smaller. Similarly, time variability in risk premiums can work
through two channels: the risk premium is the product of the price and the amount of
risk, both of which can vary through time. Below, we provide variations in the di¤erent
components of the risk premiums.
First, there is the time variation in the compensation for risk that the shareholders
expect in return for bearing part of the aggregate risk. This corresponds to time variation
in the price of risk, which is summarized in the Sharpe ratio. The Sharpe ratio itself is
a function of the volatility of marginal utility, as well as its comovement with the assets
payo¤. In the present model, the shareholderse¤ective risk aversion is virtually constant.
The reason is that the shareholders are extremely wealthy (see the wealth distribution of
the three agents). As a result, time variation in the Sharpe ratio is fully driven by variation
in the conditional volatility of consumption.23 Figure 4 shows this conditional volatility
of shareholder consumption growth and, in particular, its countercyclical nature. All risk
premiums share this component. Hence, variation in consumption growth volatility is the
driving force between the comovement of the various risk premiums of Figure 3.
Second, there is time variation in the amount of aggregate risk the shareholders bear
across the cycle. The latter is summarized in the expected variability of the returns. Here
23For the heterogeneous agent model with GHH preferences, the labor e¤ect is quantitatively not very
important.
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lies the main explanation for the time variation and the overall magnitudes of risk premiums,
as well as the relative di¤erences in them between stocks and bonds. Figure 5 shows the
conditional volatilities for the various assets in our model economy. Clearly, the return
volatility for stocks varies substantially over the business cycle. For bonds, this is much less
the case.
In sum, the time variation in risk premiums stems from variation in both return and
shareholder consumption volatility. The obvious next question is: where does it come from?
First of all, as with the average risk premiums, the main source lies in the worker-shareholder
interaction. Although the Guvenen mechanism is at work (where bondholdersdemand for
insurance is higher in recessions, and thereby the volatility of shareholder consumption), it
is quantitatively negligible. What matters is that operational and nancial leverage make
prots and in particular dividends much more volatile in recessions. The volatile dividends
translate into more volatile returns. Financial leverage, however, does not a¤ect shareholders
income and thus cannot explain the surges in shareholder consumption volatility observed in
recessions in Figure 4. The cause of increased volatility in shareholder income is operational
leverage. Operational leverage implies a wage share that is countercyclical. Just as the
shareholder is at his lowest wealth level, the volatility of prots will reach its highest level.
<<FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE>>
<<FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE>>
Interestingly, even though the model does not receive any nancial market data as inputs,
it associates the current crisis with substantial nancial volatility. In particular, the nal
quarter of 2008 marks the single most dramatic increase in the price of risk in our sample:
the conditional Sharpe ratio increases by more than 5% (and 2009q1 a close second with a
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rise of 4.3%). The equity and bond risk premiums also record unseen single-quarter jumps
at over 60 and 10bp, respectively. In cumulative terms, the equity risk premium has gone up
by 163bp during the current slowdown, while the bond premium has increased with 31bp.
The documented countercyclical behavior of risk premiums is consistent with both theory
and evidence in the nance literature. Risk averse investors should require high returns when
their marginal utility of consumption is high. Predictive regressions, for instance, also suggest
expected returns are high in "bad" times.
6.2 Impact on Prediction Performance of P/D and Yield Spread
Predictability regressions for stock returns and bond returns are often used as tests for time-
varying risk premiums. In this section we repeat the standard predictability regressions on
the model-implied data in order to test whether our time-varying risk premiums can generate
the same type of results as typically found in the data.
Stock Return Predictability
Stock returns in the data vary over the cycle, and seem to be forecastable by a variety of
variables. Financial ratios are particularly successful in predicting future returns. Moreover,
these nancial ratios are tied to general business cycle conditions (see, e.g., Fama and French,
1989). The price-dividend ratio (pt dt, where small case letters denote logs) is probably the
variable that the nance literature has focused on the most.24 In short, predictive regressions
of the form
RSt;t+h = 
r + r(pt   dt)t + "t (34)
24For a more complete list of variables and papers studying them, we refer the reader to Lettau and Van
Nieuwerburgh (2008).
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typically nd signicantly negative estimates for r and high R2, and both tend to in-
crease (in absolute value) as the forecasting horizon h becomes longer. There is a large
amount of evidence suggesting that one should be wary of the statistical properties of re-
gressions like these, mostly due to the persistence of the right hand side variable. Cochrane
(2008b) and Lettau and Van Nieuwerburgh (2008) are two recent examples that show how
the basic nding of predictability remains despite many of the statistical artefacts.25
The left-hand panel of Table 15 replicates the above nding for the sample period 1947-
2007. In the right-hand panel we perform the same regressions based on data generated
by the model. Guvenen (2009) performs the same exercise. As in the latter study, the
table shows that the present model, too, reproduces the main patterns found in predictive
regressions, although the degree of predictability is still too small in the model.
<<TABLE 15 ABOUT HERE>>
Campbell-Shiller Regressions
The time variation in the risk premium for bonds is usually tested using the Campbell and
Shiller (1991, CS) regressions:26
yn 1;t+1   yn;t = +  1
n  1

yn;t  Rft

+ et (35)
Under the null of the expectations hypothesis, i.e. of a constant term premium  = 1. In
Table 16, we present the results of this regression applied to historical data for the ten-year
bond yield, where the LHS of the regression is approximated by (yn;t+1 yn;t). The estimated
25For a more comprehensive overview, see, e.g., Cochrane (2008a).
26There is another version of the test of the expectations hypothesis which uses forward rates instead of
yields, see Fama and Bliss (1987). We do not take this approach here.
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beta coe¢ cient is -3.8, which is signicantly lower than the null hypothesis of  = 1: When
testing this regression for the simulated data of the model, using the historical realizations of
the two shocks, we follow Rudebusch and Swanson (2009), and adjust the above expression,
which holds for a zero-coupon bond of maturity n, to hold for our decaying coupon perpetuity
with duration n. The CS regression (35) becomes:
log(pnt )  log(pnt+1) = + (ynt  Rft ) + et (36)
where pnt the bond price, y
n
t its yield and R
f
t the short interest rate: Under the expectations
hypothesis  = 0 and  = 1, i.e. the coe¢ cients in the above regression have the same
interpretation as in the standard zero-coupon case. The estimated value for beta is 0.30 and
not signicantly di¤erent from one. Also the R2 in the model is lower than in the data.
In sum, there is a substantial degree of time variation in the model risk premiums, and its
dynamics compare fairly well to observable proxies. However, predictive regressions indicate
that more is needed.
<<TABLE 16 ABOUT HERE>>
7 Conclusions
The objective of this paper was to build a DSGE model that is able to t well both on the
real and the nancial side of the economy. The results illustrate that a heterogeneous agent
model can be a useful alternative to the standard representative agent model for modelling
jointly the real and the nancial side of the economy. Starting from a realistic classication of
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households in three groups, portfolio investors, bondholders and workers who di¤er from each
other in terms of capital market participation and risk aversion, our model generates high
risk premiums and reasonable dynamics for the intra- and intertemporal allocation decisions.
There are two important ingredients for generating the high risk premiums. Firstly, the
concentration of consumption risk in the group of shareholders results in high prices of risk.
Secondly, the labor contract and the presence of distribution risk result in a high volatility
of capital returns. The bond market, that allows for a redistribution of risk between bond-
and shareholders, has a relatively minor impact on the results.
The model also generates a signicant degree of countercyclical time variation in the
risk premiums. The time variation in the equity premium is consistent with the empirically
observed predictive power of price-dividend ratios for future stock returns as well as more
direct proxies of expected returns. The term premium on long bonds also displays some
time variation but less than typically found in empirical models of the bond spread and
insu¢ cient to explain the predictive power of the spread for future excess returns on bonds.
To overcome this problem, future analysis could introduce variations on utility functions
(e.g., habit persistence or stochastic risk aversion) or stochastic volatility in macroeconomic
risk to reinforce the variation in the price of risk, which is the main driver for bond premiums.
For future work, it would also be interesting to complete the stochastic structure of the
model and to estimate the complete model, augmented with sticky prices and a monetary
policy rule, on the data. Recent progress in higher order estimation methods suggests that
such an exercise will become feasible soon. However, a complete higher order approximation
of the model is probably not required given the limited magnitude of the feedback e¤ects
from risk premiums towards the real economy. In order to increase these feedback e¤ects,
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one could consider a model switching framework, in which the parameters of the model,
and in particular the risk aversion, can also change in line with the stochastic risks that
hit the economy. Alternatively, one could add nancial frictions to the model so that the
required risk premiums have rst order e¤ects on consumption and investment decisions. A
joint t of the nancial and the real data will imply a more exact validation test for the
model. It remains to be seen how the heterogeneous agent setting performs in explaining the
real variables relative to the representative agent models which are now standard in New-
Keynesian monetary models (e.g., Smets and Wouters, 2007). In that respect, it is important
to stress that the model is able to generate endogenously the observed real wage rigidity as
the result of an e¢ cient risk sharing arrangement between workers and rms. This view on
wage rigidity was popular in the late seventies, and recently regained support from micro
studies on wage dynamics and their reaction to transitory rm-specic shocks (Guiso et al.,
2005).
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Figure 1: Consumption Dynamics for the Three Agents (one std. err. Productivity Shock)
Note: Solid black lines denote the consumption response of the di¤erent agents in the benchmark model.
For bondholders (middle panel), the additional dashed line measures the sum of their consumption and the
bond trade in the benchmark model. For workers (right panel), the dashed line measures the sum of their
consumption and the wage premium, also in the benchmark model. The grey solid lines are consumption
responses in the model without the distributional e¤ect of productivity shocks.
Figure 2: Decomposition of the Risk Premium on Equity and Bonds
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Figure 3: Time-Varying Risk Premiums
Note: The graph shows model implied expected one period returns for stocks, nominal and
real bonds (10 year maturity). The term premium = y40t   y40t , where y40t is the risk
neutral yield. The premiums are expressed in annualized percentages, i.e. quarterly model
concepts are multiplied by 400.
Figure 4: Conditional Volatility of Shareholder Consumption Growth
Figure 5: Conditional Volatility of Stock and Bond Returns
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Table 1: Calibration of the Parameters
    0B  1 2 3 
0.99 0.025 0.30 0.5 5  10 5 0.3 4 10 10 1.75
Table 2: Calibration of the Stochastic Structure
z z   z;
0.0064 0.944 0.0253 0.987 -0.54
Table 3: Financial Statistics
SR EP BP y40  Rf Rf Rf RS C1 C2 C3
Data
1947-2007 0.39 6.11 1.06 1.34 1.19 2.84 15.50 - - -
1926-2007 0.26 5.85 1.76 - 0.60 5.27 22.35 - - -
Models
T1+T2+T3 0.24 5.18 2.34 1.81 1.26 1.98 22.18 3.23 1.66 1.28
T1+T3 ("z;";) 0.26 6.72 2.83 2.24 0.50 2.09 25.43 3.31 - 1.24
T1+T3 ("z;") 0.22 4.41 1.79 1.39 1.69 1.80 20.55 3.66 - 1.83
T1+T3 ("z) 0.12 1.64 0.90 0.61 3.29 1.51 13.45 1.90 - 1.32
T1+T2 0.09 1.03 0.66 0.37 3.64 1.51 11.47 1.56 1.46 -
T1 0.09 0.87 0.54 0.34 3.63 1.23 9.64 1.61 - -
Note: For the period 1926:1-1998:4 we use the dataset of Campbell (2003). For the period 1999:1-
2007:4 we use the United States MSCI from Datastream to calculate the equity statistics. To
calculate the bond statistics we use the FED Funds rate and the ten year bond from the BIS.
The standard deviation of the annualized interest and ination rate is computed as 400 times the
quarterly model concept. The standard deviation of the equity return is computed as that of a
compounded annual return. The standard deviation of the annualized equity return is 200 times the
quarterly model concept.  and  refer to mean term premium and holding period return over the
period 1961-2007, and are taken from Rudebusch and Swanson (2009, Table 2).
60
Table 4: Macroeconomic Statistics
Y I I;Y C C;Y N N;Y W W;Y WN=Y WN=Y;Y
Data
1947-2008 1.72 4.94 0.76 1.17 0.79 1.34 0.87 0.78 0.09 2.34 -0.19
Models
T1+T2+T3 1.72 3.30 0.96 1.34 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.68 0.08 3.02 -0.20
T1+T3 ("z;";) 1.72 3.46 0.95 1.33 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.86 -0.15 3.95 -0.20
T1+T3 ("z;") 1.72 2.89 0.89 1.53 0.97 0.98 1.00 1.09 0.38 3.66 -0.08
T1+T3 ("z) 1.72 2.57 1.00 1.49 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.42 1.00 0.74 -0.38
T1+T2 1.72 2.57 1.00 1.49 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.74 1.00 0.00 0.00
T1 1.72 2.16 1.00 1.61 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.74 1.00 0.00 0.00
Note: The data come from the FRED database at the St-Louis Fed and the BLS. All real variables have been
detrended with the Hodrick-Prescott lter except for the wage share. The output correlation of the wage share is
the correlation between HP-ltered output and the unltered wage share.
Table 5: Financial Statistics: Stochastic Structure
SR EP BP y40  Rf Rf Rf RS C1 C2 C3
Baseline: "z;"; 0.24 5.18 2.34 1.81 1.26 1.98 22.18 3.23 1.66 1.28
Volatility
"z 0.12 1.60 0.90 0.59 3.33 1.56 13.47 1.88 1.48 1.32
" 0.14 1.75 0.58 0.49 2.93 0.77 11.80 1.79 0.30 1.35
"z;" 0.19 3.35 1.48 1.11 2.22 1.74 17.91 2.61 1.51 1.88
Persistence
z  0:9 0.23 5.00 2.45 1.77 1.53 2.98 22.64 2.99 1.47 1.28
  0:9 0.18 3.77 2.20 1.41 2.45 2.84 21.15 2.57 1.63 1.38
Table 6: Macroeconomic Statistics: Stochastic Structure
Y I I;Y C C;Y N N;Y W W;Y WN=Y WN=Y;Y
Baseline: "z;"; 1.72 3.30 0.96 1.34 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.68 0.08 3.02 -0.20
Volatility
"z 1.72 2.64 1.00 1.47 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.49 1.00 0.64 -0.34
" 0.05 1.02 -0.05 0.29 0.25 0.03 1.00 0.81 0.14 2.63 0.02
"z;" 1.72 2.83 0.93 1.50 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.94 0.52 2.79 -0.08
Persistence
z  0:9 1.64 3.44 0.97 1.20 0.98 0.94 1.00 0.70 0.05 2.82 -0.19
  0:9 1.72 4.05 0.90 1.28 0.93 0.99 1.00 0.77 0.03 1.46 -0.42
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Table 7: Implied Elasticities for Utility Functions
SEP KPR GHH
cc   

 1
cn;n 0 (   1)   1
cc + nc;c  1 0
nn + cn;n   (  1)    (  1)
Note: This table assumes C =WN .
Table 8: Financial Statistics: Utility Specications
SR EP BP y40  Rf Rf Rf RS C1 C2 C3
1947-2007 0.39 6.11 1.06 1.34 1.19 2.84 15.50 - - -
1926-2007 0.26 5.85 1.76 - 0.60 5.27 22.35 - - -
T1-model
SEP 0.03 0.09 0.06 0.02 4.00 0.45 3.17 - - -
KPR 0.06 0.36 0.24 0.13 3.88 0.86 6.34 - - -
GHH 0.09 0.87 0.54 0.34 3.63 1.23 9.64 - - -
GHH =10 0.16 2.10 1.39 1.00 2.73 1.76 13.14 - - -
T1+T2+T3 model
SEP 0.12 1.72 0.77 0.55 3.27 1.24 13.87 2.02 0.47 0.64
KPR 0.17 3.24 1.43 1.06 2.51 1.62 18.62 2.40 0.98 0.79
GHH (=Baseline) 0.24 5.18 2.34 1.81 1.26 1.98 22.18 3.23 1.66 1.28
Table 9: Macroeconomic Statistics: Utility Specications
Y I I;Y C C;Y N N;Y W W;Y WN=Y WN=Y;Y
1947-2008 1.72 4.94 0.76 1.17 0.79 1.34 0.87 0.78 0.09 2.34 -0.19
T1-model
SEP 0.51 0.71 1.00 0.46 1.00 0.75 -1.00 1.26 1.00 - -
KPR 1.06 1.42 1.00 0.96 1.00 0.04 1.00 1.02 1.00 - -
GHH 1.72 2.16 1.00 1.61 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.74 1.00 - -
GHH =10 1.72 2.94 1.00 1.39 1.00 0.98 1.00 0.74 1.00 - -
T1+T2+T3 model
SEP 0.87 1.95 0.99 0.58 0.99 0.31 -0.70 0.80 0.56 2.16 -0.26
KPR 1.15 2.57 0.97 0.80 0.98 0.20 0.88 0.76 0.30 2.89 -0.23
GHH (=Baseline) 1.72 3.30 0.96 1.34 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.68 0.08 3.02 -0.20
62
Table 10: Financial Statistics: Structural Parameters
SR EP BP y40  Rf Rf Rf RS C1 C2 C3
1947-2007 0.39 6.11 1.06 1.34 1.19 2.84 15.50 - - -
1926-2007 0.26 5.85 1.76 - 0.60 5.27 22.35 - - -
Baseline 0.24 5.18 2.34 1.81 1.26 1.98 22.18 3.23 1.66 1.28
 = 3 0.26 6.38 2.72 2.14 0.69 2.06 24.87 3.73 1.42 1.63
 = 0:3 0.27 7.27 3.52 2.62 0.38 2.64 27.13 3.66 1.72 1.30
 = 0:4 0.24 6.01 2.34 1.81 1.26 1.98 25.72 3.23 1.66 1.28
Note: Baseline parameter values are  = 1:75;  = 0:5;  =0.3.
Table 11: Macroeconomic Statistics: Structural Parameters
Y I I;Y C C;Y N N;Y W W;Y WN=Y WN=Y;Y
1947-2008 1.72 4.94 0.76 1.17 0.79 1.34 0.87 0.78 0.09 2.34 -0.19
Baseline 1.72 3.30 0.96 1.34 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.68 0.08 3.02 -0.20
 = 3 1.34 3.25 0.94 0.94 0.94 0.45 1.00 0.98 0.00 4.10 -0.20
 = 0:3 1.72 2.73 0.96 1.48 0.99 0.98 1.00 0.68 0.17 2.88 -0.19
 = 0:4 1.72 3.30 0.96 1.34 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.68 0.08 3.02 -0.20
Table 12: Financial Statistics: Heterogeneity
SR EP BP y40  Rf Rf Rf RS C1 C2 C3
1947-2007 0.39 6.11 1.06 1.34 1.19 2.84 15.50 - - -
1926-2007 0.26 5.85 1.76 - 0.60 5.27 22.35 - - -
Baseline 0.24 5.18 2.34 1.81 1.26 1.98 22.18 3.23 1.66 1.28
s;b;w = 4 0.24 5.24 2.28 1.80 1.16 1.86 22.01 3.25 2.08 1.67
s;b;w = 10 0.32 7.13 3.60 2.93 -1.04 2.28 22.83 1.91 1.76 1.25
Table 13: Macroeconomic Statistics: Heterogeneity
Y I I;Y C C;Y N N;Y W W;Y WN=Y WN=Y;Y
1947-2008 1.72 4.94 0.76 1.17 0.79 1.34 0.87 0.78 0.09 2.34 -0.19
Baseline 1.72 3.30 0.96 1.34 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.68 0.08 3.02 -0.20
s;b;w = 4 1.72 3.12 0.93 1.43 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.93 0.07 3.39 -0.18
s;b;w = 10 1.72 3.72 0.96 1.24 0.98 0.98 1.00 0.62 0.26 2.54 -0.20
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Table 14: Time-Varying Risk Premiums
Measure of premium Unconditional Std. Dev. Output Corr.
Equity (excess, expected) Et(R
S
t+1 Rft ) 1.36 -0.85
Equity (excess, realized) RSt+1 Rft 25.87 0.50
Bond (excess, expected) Et(hprt+1) 0.31 -0.82
Bond (excess, realized) hprt+1 8.89 -0.10
Term Premium y40t  y40t 0.34 -0.86
Slope Yield Curve y40t  Rft 2.31 0.75
Table 15: Predictive Regressions: Stocks
Data Model
Return Horizon Beta t-stat R2 Beta t-stat R2
Returns
4 -0.124 -5.082 0.099 -0.119 -3.025 0.037
10 -0.288 -8.105 0.223 -0.305 -5.121 0.101
20 -0.560 -11.275 0.367 -0.316 -4.772 0.092
40 -1.338 -15.115 0.534 -0.647 -7.068 0.197
Excess Returns
4 -0.130 -5.352 0.109 -0.071 -1.726 0.012
10 -0.293 -8.450 0.238 -0.210 -3.246 0.043
20 -0.548 -11.786 0.388 -0.162 -2.142 0.020
40 -1.287 -17.047 0.594 -0.449 -3.968 0.072
Note: Regressions of log returns on log dividend yield. Horizon in quarters. Model
dividend yield based on steady state level dividends. Data: see note Table 3.
Table 16: Predictive Regressions: Bonds
Data Model
Horizon Beta t-stat R2 Beta t-stat R2
40 -3.797 2.831 0.032 0.302 0.754 0.002
Note: Regressions of yield change on spread for the data and minus
log price change on spread for the model. Horizon in quarters.
Data: see note Table 3.
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Table 17: Estimation Results for the Stochastic Structure of the Model
prior distribution posterior distribution
distr. mean stdev. mode 90% interval
structural shocks
stdev productivity z inv-gamma 0.25 2.00 0.64 0.59 0.70
AR(1) productivity z beta 0.50 0.25 0.944 0.927 0.961
stdev distribution v inv-gamma 0.25 2.00 2.53 2.29 2.63
AR(1) distribution v beta 0.50 0.25 0.987 0.973 0.991
correlation z;v normal 0.00 0.25 -0.54 -0.50 -0.69
measurement error
output growth y uniform 0.30 0.30 0.62 0.58 0.72
consumption growth c uniform 0.30 0.30 0.68 0.63 0.75
investment growth i uniform 0.75 0.75 1.87 1.84 2.04
real wage growth w uniform 0.125 0.125 0.34 0.32 0.34
hours worked h uniform 0.20 0.20 0.37 0.31 0.43
trend growth  normal 0.40 0.10 0.46 0.42 0.49
Note: The stochastic structure of the model is estimated based on ve real vari-
ables: US data for GDP, consumption, investment, wages (all real and expressed
per capita) and hours worked. Observables are measured in log di¤erence (log for
hours). The sample runs from 1947q3-2009q1. Estimation is executed with Dynare.
Prior distributions are relatively uniformative: the prior for the standard deviations
of the measurement errors are set proportional to the standard deviation of the vari-
able. The posterior distribution is approximated with 50.000 MCMC-iterations.
Standard stability and convergence tests are satised.
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